

## Message Text

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TO USMISSION NATO

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S E C R E T STATE 007762

E.O. 11652:GDS

TAGS:PARM, NATO

SUBJECT:MBFR, UK STATEMENT ON FREEZE, AIR FORCE MANPOWER,  
DATA

1. THERE FOLLOWS BELOW THE TEXT OF THE UK STATEMENT ON THE  
EASTERN FREEZE PROPOSAL, AIR FORCE MANPOWER AND DATA AS  
PRESENTED BY UK EMBASSY COUNSELOR WILBERFORCE TO ACDA ON  
JANUARY 10, 1975.

2. BEGIN TEXT: UK EMBASSY DEMARCHE TO ACDA OF JAN 10, 1975.

THE SOVIET FREEZE PROPOSAL

IN OUR VIEW THE QUESTION OF HOW THE ALLIES SHOULD

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RESPOND IS THE MOST PRESSING PROBLEM FOR THE FIFTH ROUND.

WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT A CATEGORICAL REJECTION IS FEASIBLE. WE CONTINUE TO THINK THAT THE MOST EFFECTIVE RESPONSE WOULD BE TO PUT FORWARD A COUNTER-PROPOSAL DESIGNED TO EXPOSE THE DEFECTS OF THE EASTERN DRAFT AND EXPLOIT THE WARSAW PACT'S VULNERABILITY ON THE DATA QUESTION. OUR REASONS ARE PRIMARILY POLITICAL. WE THINK THAT IF THE ALLIES WERE TO REJECT THE EASTERN PROPOSAL OUT OF HAND, THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY GO PUBLIC AND EXPLOIT THE UNDOUBTED PROPAGANDA ADVANTAGES OF THEIR

PROPOSAL. A FREEZE WOULD BE REGARDED BY MANY PEOPLE IN WESTERN EUROPE AS A LOGICAL PRELUDE TO REDUCTIONS. MORE-OVER EVEN AN ALLIED REJECTION OF THE PROPOSAL COULD NOT BE RELIED UPON TO DISCOURAGE THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES FROM CONTINUING TO PRESS IT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AND TO MAKE POLITICAL CAPITAL OUT OF IT IN PUBLICITY.

WE HAVE GIVEN CAREFUL THOUGHT TO THE FORM AND CONTENT OF THE WESTERN COUNTER-PROPOSAL. IN OUR VIEW IT SHOULD BE SO FRAMED AS TO ENABLE THE ALLIES TO RECOVER THE TACTICAL INITIATIVE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, AND HOLD THEIR OWN IF THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES DECIDE TO GO PUBLIC WITH THEIR PROPOSAL. IT SHOULD THEREFORE BE OF EQUAL SUBSTANCE TO THE EASTERN PROPOSAL AND IF POSSIBLE EXPOSE THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES WHERE THEIR CASE IS MOST VULNERABLE.

DURING THE DEBATE ON THIS QUESTION BEFORE THE END OF THE LAST ROUND WE ADVOCATED A WESTERN COUNTER-PROPOSAL WHICH WOULD HAVE ENTAILED A FREEZE ON MANPOWER PRIOR TO THE CONCLUSION OF NEGOTIATIONS ON PHASE I REDUCTIONS, BUT WHICH INCLUDED SUCH ESSENTIAL ALLIED REQUIREMENTS AS A CLEAR LIMIT ON ITS DURATION AND AN EXCHANGE OF DATA. ON FURTHER REFLECTION WE HAVE CONCLUDED THAT ALTHOUGH THERE ARE GOOD ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF PROPOSING A FREEZE ON THESE LINES, WHICH WOULD CONSTRAIN WARSAW PACT FORCES ON THE BASIS OF AGREED DATA WHILE NEGOTIATIONS WERE PROCEEDING, IT COULD CARRY THE RISK THAT NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT BE SIDE-TRACKED INTO DISCUSSION OF A PROPOSAL WHOSE PRINCIPAL EFFECT WOULD BE TO PERPETUATE THE EXISTING DISPARITIES BETWEEN THE FORCES OF THE TWO SIDES. IN ADDITION, WHATEVER THE LIMIT ON DURA-  
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TION, IT WOULD BE POLITICALLY DIFFICULT TO END THE FREEZE EVEN IF THE NEGOTIATIONS HAD NOT MADE REAL PROGRESS. A FURTHER DIFFICULTY IS THAT, GIVEN THE OBJECTIONS ALREADY RAISED AGAINST A PROPOSAL ON THESE LINES, IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT, IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE, TO SECURE EARLY AGREEMENT ON IT WITHIN THE ALLIANCE, AND THUS THE POLITICAL AND TACTICAL NEED FOR A QUICK RESPONSE WOULD NOT BE MET.

WE HAVE CONSIDERED THE ALTERNATIVES, AND THINK THAT A BETTER COURSE MIGHT BE FOR THE ALLIES TO MAKE A COUNTER-PROPOSAL TO THE WARSAW PACT FOR A GROUND AND AIR MANPOWER FREEZE WHICH WOULD COME INTO EFFECT FROM THE MOMENT THAT A PHASE I AGREEMENT WAS REACHED. IN SUBSTANCE THIS WOULD NOT GIVE THE WARSAW PACT MORE THAN THE ALLIES HAVE ALREADY PROMISED WITH THEIR OFFERS OF NO-INCREASE COMMITMENTS ON GROUND AND AIR FORCES, BUT IT WOULD MEAN THAT THE START OF THE FREEZE WOULD NOT HAVE TO WAIT UNTIL RATIFICATION AND ENTRY INTO FORCE OF A PHASE I AGREEMENT, AND WOULD THEREFORE REPRESENT SOME CONCESSION COMPARED WITH THE EXISTING

NO-INCREASE OFFERS. THUS IT WOULD USE AND HARNESS THE IDEA OF A FREEZE TO SERVE ALLIED PURPOSES, AND PROVIDE THE ALLIES WITH A GOOD POSITION IF THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES DECIDED TO GO PUBLIC WITH THEIR PROPOSAL. IN ADDITION IT SHOULD NOT CAUSE THE ALLIANCE EXCESSIVE DIFFICULTY, AND WITH LUCK MIGHT BE AGREED ON FAIRLY SOON. THE PROPOSAL WOULD INCLUDE PROVISION FOR AGREEMENT ON DATA AS AN ESSENTIAL PREREQUISITE FOR A FREEZE AS WELL AS FOR A REDUCTIONS AGREEMENT.

WE ARE PLANNING TO RAISE THIS IDEA IN THE ALLIANCE BUT BEFORE DOING SO WE SHOULD WELCOME US VIEWS.

#### AIR FORCE MANPOWER

WE SHARE THE VIEW THAT THE ALLIES SHOULD OFFER TO INCLUDE AIR FORCE MANPOWER IN THE COMMON CEILING AND SEE NO DIFFICULTY FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW IN AUTHORIZING ALLIED NEGOTIATORS TO DO SO AT A FAIRLY EARLY STAGE IN THE NEXT ROUND. BUT AN OFFER TO DISCUSS REDUCTIONS OF US AND SOVIET AIR FORCE MANPOWER WOULD, IN OUR VIEW, CONSTITUTE A SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN THE EXISTING ALLIED APPROACH, AND REQUIRE DETAILED CONSIDERATION WITHIN THE ALLIANCE.

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ALTHOUGH WE OURSELVES WOULD WELCOME SUCH CONSIDERATION, IT WOULD TAKE TIME AND IT WOULD NOT BE EASY TO REACH AGREEMENT. APART FROM THE COMPLEX TECHNICAL IMPLICATIONS, THE PROPOSAL RAISES THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE ALLIES SHOULD CONTEMPLATE MAKING A CONCESSION OF THIS NATURE AT A TIME WHEN THE WARSAW PACT SHOW NO DISPOSITION TO MAKE ANY COMPARABLE GESTURE OF FLEXIBILITY IN RETURN. IT IS ALSO OPEN TO QUESTION WHETHER IT WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE ALLIED OBJECTIVE OF REDUCING THE COMBAT CAPABILITY OF WARSAW PACT GROUND FORCES. MOREOVER ALTHOUGH IT CONCERNS ONLY AMERICAN AND SOVIET AIR FORCE MANPOWER IT COULD ESTABLISH AN UNDESIRABLE PRECEDENT BOTH FOR EQUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS AND FOR EUROPEAN AIR FORCES IN PHASE II.

DATA

IT WOULD BE NECESSARY, IF WE OFFERED TO INCLUDE AIR  
FORCE MANPOWER IN THE COMMON CEILING, UNILATERALLY TO  
DISCLOSE FIGURES FOR AIR FORCE MANPOWER. BUT AS REGARDS  
GROUND FORCE FIGURES IT IS STILL OUR VIEW, FOR THE REASONS  
GIVEN IN PARAGRAPH 8 (II) OF THE AD HOC GROUP REPORT OF  
12 DECEMBER, THAT NO USEFUL PURPOSE WOULD BE SERVED AT  
PRESENT BY A UNILATERAL DISCLOSURE OF THE AGREED DATA  
ESTIMATES, PARTICULARLY SINCE THE ALLIED FIGURES FOR NATO  
FORCES ARE IN ANY CASE MORE THAN A YEAR OUT OF DATE. WE  
SHOULD PREFER TO SEE THE ALLIANCE TAKE A MORE ROBUST ATTITUDE  
ON THE SUBJECT OF DATA GENERALLY IN ORDER TO EXPLOIT  
THE WARSAW PACT'S CONTINUING RELUCTANCE TO COME CLEAN ON  
FIGURES. END TEXT. KISSINGER

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